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Abstract
We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial
reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory
strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are
more likely to enforce restatements of banks’ call reports. Further, we find that the effect
of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up
to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results
from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing
financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises.
We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put
significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting
transparency.
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1 Introduction
According to a prominent narrative of the recent financial crisis, lax regulatory enforcement
of financial reporting transparency in the banking sector was a key contributor to the buildup
of risks that preceded the problems in the financial system.1 Investors, market participants,
and members of the financial press alleged that banking regulators catered to the interests of
the financial industry and failed to enforce financial reporting transparency. Others claimed
that banking regulators loosened their enforcement of financial reporting transparency to
insulate banks from market pressures that would have forced them to further cut lending and
sell assets at already discounted prices (e.g. Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011); Beatty and
Liao (2014)). However, there is little empirical evidence about whether regulators tightened
or loosened their oversight of banks’ financial reporting over the last business cycle. We
provide evidence on the role of regulators in enforcing financial reporting transparency before,
during, and in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
We use a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy
to provide evidence on the relation between regulatory oversight and financial reporting
transparency.2 Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi (2014) exploit the pre-determined rotation
schedule of state and federal regulatory examinations to develop an index of the strictness
of each state bank regulator. This measure captures the average difference between the
confidential regulatory ratings assigned by state regulators and the rating assigned to the same
bank by federal regulators. The authors document that a softer stance of state regulators
relative to their federal counterparts is associated with negative outcomes, such as higher
1For examples of these arguments see “The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators,”
from the Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on October 23, 2008
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg55764/html/CHRG-110hhrg55764.htm). During these hear-
ings, Christopher Cox, then chairman of the SEC, suggested that the lack of financial reporting transparency
contributed to the financial crisis by letting risks grow “in darkness.”
2Throughout the paper we use the terms ‘regulatory strictness’ or ‘strict regulator’ interchangeably with
the phrase ‘regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy.’
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bank failure rates and a lower likelihood of repayment of funds borrowed under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). We build on their paper under the assumption that stricter
regulators are associated with better banking outcomes. Our paper asks whether strict
regulators that perform well on a number of dimensions are also more likely to enforce higher
reporting transparency. Conceptually, the relation between strict regulatory enforcement
and financial reporting transparency is ambiguous. For example, strict state regulators may
be less likely to enforce reporting transparency if they perceive that enforcing transparency
could potentially destabilize sound financial institutions. Thus, it is an empirical question
whether strict regulators that perform well on a number of dimensions enforce higher or lower
transparency.
Our measure of regulatory enforcement of financial reporting transparency is the likelihood
of regulatory restatements. Regulators audit the content of regulatory reports during on-site
examinations. A restatement captures the extent to which the regulator takes actions to
correct accounting mistakes, errors, and irregularities that misstate reported capital. We
interpret a greater incidence of regulatory restatements as enhancing the accuracy and
reliability of financial reports, thereby improving the bank’s transparency. Our measure of
transparency is distinct to our setting and captures the regulator’s role in enforcing reliable
reporting of regulatory capital. Other papers define transparency in the banking sector as
disclosures that increase the precision of the public signals about banks’ financial condition
(e.g., Goldstein and Sapra (2014); Parlatore (2015)).3
One possible concern with using regulatory restatements as a measure of reporting
transparency is that differences in restatement rates across regulators might reflect differences
in the quality of financial reporting across banks rather than differences in regulators’ ability,
objectives, and resources devoted to enforcing transparency. Our identification strategy relies
on the assumption that state and national banks operating in the same areas are subject
3In supplemental analyses we test our hypotheses using other measures of reporting transparency.
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to similar economic shocks and have similar business models.4 However, the regulatory
enforcement of state and national banks operating in the same areas likely differs substantially.
The oversight of state banks depends on the idiosyncratic characteristics of local state banking
authorities, including their ability, objectives, and resources. By contrast, a single federal
regulator oversees national banks and thus should not exhibit much variation in their oversight
across different states. We use the incidence of accounting restatements of national banks
as a baseline for the expected rate of accounting restatements of state banks located in the
same regions. In doing so, we control for the role of the bank’s local economic incentives
in shaping reporting transparency, allowing us to better isolate the role of differences in
regulatory enforcement.
We begin our empirical analysis by documenting that commercial banks are significantly
more likely to have negative restatements, i.e. restatements that reduce the level of capital
and retained earnings, when they face a stricter state regulator. By contrast, we do not find
an association between regulatory strictness and positive restatements. This finding suggests
that strict regulators induce banks to correct errors that artificially overstate regulatory
capital and is consistent with the idea that regulators face an asymmetric loss function and
prefer conservative recognition choices. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the
idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns relating transparency
to potential destabilizing effects. Instead, strict regulators, who are associated with better
regulatory outcomes, appear to increase enforcement of reporting transparency.
Next, we explore whether the relation between regulatory strictness and our measure
of reporting transparency varies over time. An important literature suggests that more
informative signals could have negative consequences, especially when economic fundamentals
4Until the 1980s, different charters implied significant differences in regulatory requirements, and therefore
the incentives of state banks likely differed from that of national banks. However, Blair and Kushmeider
(2006) document that since the 1980s these differences disappeared; banks now mainly select their charter
based on regulatory costs and regulators’ accessibility. Any remaining heterogeneity in state- versus national-
bank charter should be absorbed through our fixed effects.
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are weak. Goldstein and Sapra (2014) argue that the disclosure of stress tests could increase
the likelihood of panic-based bank runs. Though we use a different measure of transparency,
it is possible that strict regulators limit their enforcement of restatements if they fear that
such restatements have the potential to destabilize financial institutions that would otherwise
be healthy (e.g. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008)).5 On the contrary, our results indicate that
strict regulators strengthen their enforcement of accounting rules, particularly in quarters
that preceded the financial crisis.
Finally, we investigate whether strict regulators direct their enforcement efforts toward
banks with riskier portfolios. In the event of a bank failure, potential unaccounted losses in
troubled banks are borne by the deposit insurance fund (e.g. James (1991); Donovan, Frankel,
and Martin (2015)). Therefore, strict regulators may have greater incentives or may allocate
more resources toward riskier banks in order to reduce potential claims against this fund. We
measure the riskiness of a bank using the concentration of commercial real estate (CRE) loans,
consistent with Granja, Matvos, and Seru (2017) and Cole and White (2012).6 Our evidence
indicates that strict bank regulators are more likely to enforce reporting transparency early
on institutions with a high concentration of CRE loans.
One concern with our analyses is that our measure of restatements may not reflect
greater transparency. To address this concern, we assess the robustness of our results using
alternative proxies for financial reporting transparency.7 Badertscher, Burks, and Easton
(2016) show that banks often amend their call reports to correct a material misstatement
5One way this could happen is that, by sending a public signal that the bank managers misstated financial
reports, stakeholders could infer that the bank is troubled and punish them accordingly. This could lead to
behavior causing a negative spiral including a decline in deposits, bank runs, fire sales, etc.
6Both of these papers provide evidence suggesting commercial banks that failed in the aftermath of the
financial crisis had abnormally high concentrations of Commercial and Real Estate (CRE) loans.
7One possibility is that negative restatements proxy for a hidden regulatory agenda to artificially reduce
regulatory capital and create hidden capital reserves. In forcing banks to understate income, regulators can
force banks to cut dividends or to raise excess capital. However, a large literature documents banks’ incentives
to overstate the portfolio of loans and securities and capital ratios during recessions (e.g., James (1991);
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) ; Skinner (2008); Huizinga and Laeven (2012); Gallemore (2013)). Thus, if there
is an asymmetric incentive of managers to misstate income on the positive side, then greater transparency is
likely achieved through asymmetric restatements on the negative side.
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rather than restate their call reports. We develop a measure of call report amendments and
show that stricter regulators are also associated with more call report amendments. Second,
we document that banks overseen by strict regulators abnormally increase their provisions for
loan losses in the early stages of the financial crisis (Nicoletti (2016)), suggesting that these
banks reveal potential loan losses in their portfolios in a timelier manner. Supplementing our
analyses with these two additional measures helps to reinforce our inferences relating strict
regulators to greater accounting transparency.
Our paper is directly related to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to
the literature examining the role of public enforcement in shaping financial reporting and
disclosure in the banking industry. This literature primarily uses cross-country settings to
examine how regulators shape financial reporting in banks (e.g. Barth, Caprio Jr, and Levine
(2004); Bischof, Daske, Elfers, and Hail (2016); Bushman and Williams (2012)).8 Other recent
studies have looked at similar questions using quasi-natural variation in bank regulatory
enforcement (e.g. Hirtle, Kovner, and Plosser (2016), Gopalan, Kalda, and Manela (2017),
Granja (2018)). Nicoletti (2016) uses variation in regulatory strictness from Agarwal et al.
(2014) to analyze the interplay of external private auditors and bank regulators in shaping
financial reporting quality. Granja and Leuz (2017) exploit the extinction of the Office of
Thrift Supervision to investigate the effect of stricter supervision on the supply of credit. We
add to this literature by using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of
capital adequacy to isolate the role of regulatory oversight at several stages of a financial
crisis, while holding local economic incentives, state regulations and laws, and accounting
standards constant.
Second, this paper is relevant to an important literature, summarized by Beatty and Liao
(2014) and Acharya and Ryan (2016), that examines the determinants and consequences of
8Bertomeu and Magee (2011) model the relation between bank supervision and financial reporting and
show that banks with high quality loans exert political pressure to raise financial reporting quality in order
to limit discounts that occur with liquidity shocks.
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the properties of accounting and disclosure systems in the banking system. Much of this
literature discusses the importance of the timely recognition of accounting losses in improving
financial stability and access to credit. Beatty and Liao (2011) show that banks with timelier
loan loss provisions have smaller contractions in bank lending during recessionary periods,
and Bushman and Williams (2012) show that timelier expected loss recognition reduces
excessive risk-taking. Akins, Dou, and Ng (2017) show that more timely loan loss recognition
at the country level reduces corruption in lending. More related to our paper, Vyas (2011)
finds that governance quality, regulatory investigations, and litigation pressures have an
important effect on the timeliness of financial institution write-downs, and Bhat, Ryan,
and Vyas (2017) document that banks that implement better credit risk models are more
timely in provisioning for credit losses. We add to this important literature by documenting
that bank regulators play a significant role in triggering accounting decisions that curb the
overstatement of reported capital in a timely manner.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on financial restatements. Observing a financial
restatement is conditional on two events: (1) the bank’s propensity to misreport, and (2)
the probability that the error will be detected and corrected. A main challenge in the prior
literature is correctly identifying whether the observed restatement is caused by the first event
or by the second event (e.g. Rice and Weber (2012); Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2014)). Our
empirical strategy aims to isolate the effect of detection and correction on the probability of
observing a restatement. Specifically, we hold accounting standards, external incentives to
misreport, and economic conditions constant and examine the role of variation in regulatory
oversight on accounting restatements. In doing so, we show that bank regulators increase the
probability of detection and correction, which results in a higher probability of observing a
restatement.
Our results should be interpreted with a few caveats in mind. First, while we provide
evidence that strict regulators, who are associated with better regulatory outcomes, increase
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transparency, we do not directly observe the effects of this increased transparency on the
stability of the banking system. Thus, we leave it to future research to disentangle whether
strict regulators enhance stability through transparency. Second, we cannot observe regulatory
incentives, thus we cannot be certain whether strict regulators enforce reporting transparency
because they are well-intentioned or for other reasons like resource availability.9 Finally, our
restatement measure may not fully capture reporting transparency, though we show that our
results are robust to alternative measures of transparency used in the prior literature.
Section 2 provides a background and institutional details. Section 3 discusses our research
design, and Section 4 presents the data and key variables used in the empirical tests. Section
5 provides descriptive statistics of the main sample and variables used. Section 6 describes
the empirical results, and Section 7 provides robustness tests that we conduct on our main
results. Section 8 offers our conclusions.
2 Background and Institutional Details
Commercial banks that operate in the U.S. choose between a national and a state charter.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises banks that choose a national
charter, whereas local state regulators and a federal regulator (FDIC or Federal Reserve)
jointly supervise banks that choose a state charter. Thus banks supervised by both federal and
state regulators and banks that are supervised only by federal regulators operate side-by-side
in each state. In spite of being supervised by different institutions, state and national banks
face similar regulatory requirements and have similar business models (Blair and Kushmeider
9Agarwal et al. (2014) point out that there are many factors that can drive the differences in regulatory
oversight including variation in local interests, variation in resources, or variation in the extent to which the
regulator is captured. Some of these factors may be related to regulatory incentives and others may not; while
we recognize that regulatory incentives may be one important factor that impacts banking outcomes, we do
not rule out that other factors like resource availability are also important determinants of the variation in
transparency that we document in this setting.
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(2006); Agarwal et al. (2014)).10
Supervisors of commercial banks rely on both off-site and on-site monitoring activities to
oversee the operations of financial institutions. The periodic on-site examinations are crucial
to the regulatory process. These examinations allow bank examiners to secure access to
private information either by examining critical private documents or by conducting private
meetings with the management of the bank.
During the interval between consecutive on-site examinations, banking regulators conduct
off-site monitoring using information from financial and regulatory reports. The accounting
signals from the Reports of Condition and Income (call reports) are the primary source of
information regulators use to assess whether the risk profiles of banks are deteriorating and
as a result, may require corrective action. The ability of the regulators to deal with the
problems of distressed financial institutions in a timely manner hinges on the precision of
financial information and on the quality of the internal controls. Therefore, the success of
the off-site monitoring activities depends on whether regulators, auditors, and other bank
governance mechanisms ensure that the financial reporting systems of banks produce early
warning signals of financial distress.
When bank supervisors detect a mistake or irregularity in the regulatory reports, the
bank must either file an amended call report that corrects the accounting items that were
misclassified or misstated, require a restatement of prior years’ financial statements, or require
the bank to use the cumulative effects approach to address the misstatement (i.e. “catch-up
adjustments”).11
10In addition to its functions as primary regulator of state-chartered commercial banks, the Federal Reserve
is responsible for the consolidated supervision of financial institutions that are organized as bank holding
companies (BHC). According to the mandate established in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the role
of the Federal Reserve is to primarily rely on the examination reports of other agencies and to assume a
coordination role between several regulatory agencies that are involved in the supervision of the subsidiaries
of the BHC (Eisenbach, Haughwout, Hirtle, Kovner, Lucca, and Plosser (2017)).
11According to FDIC Examination manuals, examiners play an active role in auditing the financial reporting
systems and internal control procedures of banks. Gunther and Moore (2003) show that on-site supervisory
exams are associated with adverse call report revisions. Their results support the idea that examiners inspect
and force revisions of financial reports at their on-site inspections.
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A substantial number of accounting errors and irregularities are corrected through call
report amendments. Using a proprietary dataset, Badertscher et al. (2016) find that ap-
proximately 36% of the commercial banks in their sample amend their call reports after
initial submission, and 20.7% of these amendments have a non-zero impact on regulatory
capital ratios. Catch-up adjustments are less frequent than call report amendments. In a
catch-up adjustment, the regulator requires the bank to adjust the current period’s earnings
to reflect the cumulative impact of accounting errors on regulatory capital.12 According to
the FDIC’s call report instructions, these catch-up adjustments reflect “corrections resulting
from material accounting errors that were made in prior years’ Reports of Condition and
Income and not corrected by the filing of an amended report for the period in which the
error was made.” Restatements of prior years’ call reports are more visible than catch-up
adjustments because SEC-registered banks must disclose those in a 8-K filing (Tan and
Young, 2015). However, they are also very infrequent and only observable for the subsample
of publicly-listed banks. In a sample of publicly-listed banks, (Ghosh, Jarva, and Ryan, 2017)
report that only approximately 0.7% of bank-years restate prior years’ restatements.
For our main analyses, we rely on catch-up restatements to measure financial reporting
transparency. There are two significant advantages of using this measure. First, both private
and public banks must publicly disclose catch-up restatements in quarterly call reports,
whereas amended call reports are not reported publicly, and restatements of prior years’
financial statements are rare and only observable for publicly-listed banks. Researchers can
only infer whether a regulatory report was amended by comparing the time stamp on the
last submitted call report to the 30-day statutory filing period. If the time stamp on the last
submitted call report exceeds 30 days, the call report was likely amended (Badertscher et al.
(2016)). The second advantage of using catch-up restatements is that financial institutions
12Ng and Rusticus (2011) suggest that banks with catch-up adjustments have a higher likelihood of failure
during the financial crisis.
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are required to discuss the cause of the restatement in the call report, which allows us to
use textual analysis to parse the types of accounting problems that precipitated the catch-
up adjustment. This not only provides further descriptive detail of the types of problems
that lead to catch-up restatements, but it also enables us to test whether strict regulatory
enforcement is more associated with certain categories of restatements.13
Despite the advantages of using catch-up restatements, we recognize that if banks are
more likely to use amendments to correct misstatements our main measure may only partially
capture financial reporting transparency. Furthermore, Badertscher and Burks (2011) argue
that catch-up adjustments are less visible and therefore less transparent than restatements
of prior year’s financial statements; as a result, they suggest that a higher rate of catch-up
adjustments could indicate lower transparency. We address these important concerns by
re-estimating our main results using a proxy of call report amendments and a measure of
abnormal loan loss provisions as our dependent variables. Our results are robust to using
these measures supporting the idea that strict regulators induce accounting transparency.
To assess the economic importance of our restatement measure, we search the 10-Ks of
the subset of SEC-registered banks to determine whether these banks discuss the regulatory
catch-up restatements. Though only 12% of the banks in our sample are public and file
GAAP financial reports, we find that many of these public banks discuss regulatory catch-up
adjustments in their 10-Ks.14 For example, the Heritage Commerce Corporation recorded a
catch-up adjustment of $362,000 in its 2004 fourth quarter call report related to “Accounting
for Operating Leases with Scheduled Rent Increase.” Their 2004 10-K states that a similar
accounting error also forced the restatement of prior years’ financial statements: “This
material weakness resulted in restatements of the Company’s financial statements for the
13Further details on the types of restatements that are in our sample are provided in Section 5 and in Table
1, panel C. We also report the results of testing the impact of regulatory strictness on restatement type in
Section 7 and in the Online Appendix.
14In untabulated analyses, we find that our main results are stronger for non-public banks whose financial
statements are unlikely to be monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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years ended December 31, 2002 and 2003, and the first three quarters in 2004...The material
weakness resulted in accounting errors related to an asset subject to a lease.” In a similar
case, Washington Mutual Inc. reported a regulatory catch-up adjustment of $18,000,000
in 2003 related to the “Overstatement of the Cash Surrender Value of its Bank-Owned Life
Insurance” and discussed this accounting error in its 2003 10-K stating “During the fourth
quarter of 2003, the Company concluded that the inclusion of certain components...in the cash
surrender value of bank-owned life insurance policies was incorrect.” Washington Mutual also
restated their 2002, 2001, and 2000 reports in connection with this accounting error.15 In
other cases, however, the accounting error that precipitated the catch-up adjustment did not
result in a restatement of the SEC financial reports. For instance, the Harleysville National
Bank & Trust Company had a catch-up adjustment in 2009 related to purchase accounting
adjustments, but they did not restate their GAAP financial reports. They did, however,
discuss the regulatory catch-up adjustment in their 2009 10-K. Hence, the mapping between
regulatory catch-up adjustments, SEC restatements, and disclosure in 10-K filings is not
always one-to-one.
Though catch-up adjustments are used less frequently than call report amendments, all
of the restatements using the catch-up approach have an impact on Tier 1 capital, while
only 20% of the corrections using the amended call report approach affect Tier 1 capital.
The average negative impact on Tier 1 Capital for negative restatements using the catch-up
method is approximately 30 basis points. Panel A of Figure 1 plots an equal probability
histogram of the restatement amount as a fraction of risk-weighted assets. The histogram
suggests that approximately 30% of the restatements lower Tier1 capital by more than 12
basis points. A 12 basis point decrease in regulatory capital represents 4% of the regulatory
capital slack for a bank whose Tier 1 Capital Ratio is at the sample median. In Panel B of
15Other cases of accounting errors that prompted a regulatory catch-up adjustment and a restatement of
prior years 10-Ks include, for instance, Wells Fargo’s Auto Lease Reclassification in 2003 and Silicon Valley
Bank’s 2009 correction of certain gains and losses on foreign exchange contracts.
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Figure 1, we plot an equal probability histogram of the restatement amount as a percentage
of quarterly earnings. The histogram shows that more than 60% of the negative restatements
have an impact that amounts to more than 10% of quarterly earnings. Finally, in Panel C of
Figure 1, we plot an equal probability histogram of the restatement amount as a percentage of
the allowance for loan losses. The histogram shows that approximately half of the regulatory
restatements represent more than 10% of the total shock absorbing capacity embedded in
the allowance for loan losses of banks.
3 Identification Strategy
The Riegle Act of 1994 requires state and federal regulators to alternate in conducting on-site
examinations of state-chartered banks.16 Using a dataset containing the results of all on-site
examinations conducted by US banking regulators, Agarwal et al. (2014) measure state-level
regulatory leniency by calculating the average difference in the CAMELS rating assigned to
the bank by a federal regulator versus the CAMELS rating assigned to the same bank by the
corresponding state regulator. A softer average stance of the state regulators relative to their
federal counterparts is associated with negative outcomes (see Agarwal et al. (2014)) and
suggests that the state regulator is more lenient. Because the assignment of state regulators
follows a pre-determined rotation schedule, the regulatory leniency index should not be
affected by the self-selection of banks to its preferred regulator.
Our empirical analyses use the state-regulatory leniency index computed in Agarwal
et al. (2014). Unlike Agarwal et al. (2014), we do not have access to the proprietary dataset
containing the exact dates in which federal and state regulators conduct their on-site inspection
of each commercial bank operating in the U.S. banking system. Hence our measure does
16A small fraction of banks are excluded from rotations. Based on the FDIC and Federal commercial bank
examination manuals only well-capitalized banks with CAMELS ratings of 1 or 2 rotate under the AEP. In
addition, banks with assets above $10 billion are excluded. We include these banks in our analysis but the
results remain statistically and economically significant when we exclude those banks with total asset size
above $10 billion.
12
A
u
th
or
M
an
u
sc
ri
p
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
not exploit the time-varying rotation of on-site inspections by state regulators. Instead, we
use the average difference in state versus federal regulatory ratings, calculated for each state
regulator over our sample period.
We model the likelihood of a negative restatement of bank i in quarter t using the following
linear probability model:
Pr(Restatement)itcr = αc + φt + ψr + βLeniencycr + ΓXit + itcr (1)
where i indexes the bank, t indexes the time period, c indexes the county location of the
bank headquarters, and r indexes the regulatory authority (state or federal). We use a linear
probability model to allay concerns with the incidental parameters problem, though our
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar when using a conditional logit specification
as we show in the Online Appendix.
The main specification includes county fixed-effects to absorb variation in the likelihood of
restatement across counties, quarter fixed effects to account for general macroeconomic trends,
and a regulator fixed effect to control for differences in restatements between federal and state
regulators. We also employ a more rigorous specification that includes county-by-quarter
fixed effects that capture time-varying county-level unobservable economic factors affecting
restatements. The focus on within-county variation is important because there is substantial
cross-sectional variation in economic conditions across counties that could also affect the
propensity to misstate (e.g. Mian and Sufi (2009); Mian and Sufi (2010)). In addition, state
regulators are more lenient in economically depressed regions (e.g. Agarwal et al. (2014)).
Hence, variation in local economic shocks could simultaneously affect the banks’ propensity
to misstate and the leniency of state regulators, thereby distorting our results. Our empirical
strategy compares whether, on average, the differences in restatement rates between state
and national banks within the same county are greater in the counties of states with stricter
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state banking regulators than in states with more lenient state banking regulators. By taking
differences between state and national banks within a county, we parse out the cross-county
variation in economic conditions.
The main variable of interest, Leniencycr, is defined as the regulatory leniency index from
Agarwal et al. (2014). It takes non-zero values when a state authority regulates the bank,
and it is assigned a value of zero when federal regulators solely regulate the bank.17 Finally,
Xit is a vector of time-varying characteristics of the commercial bank including the total
assets of the bank, total deposits of the bank, percentage of residential loans, percentage of
commercial real estate loans, percentage of consumer loans, fraction of loans that are classified
as non-performing, liquidity ratio, and capitalization ratio. In all regressions, we cluster
standard errors at the state-by-regulator level to account for any correlation in unobservables
across banks that are supervised by the same regulator within a state.18
Our research design relies on the fact that, within each county and quarter, state-chartered
banks operate side-by-side with national-chartered banks. State banks are regulated by state
regulators that have varying degrees of regulatory leniency depending on the state where
the bank is chartered, whereas national banks are regulated by federal regulators having
the same leniency index regardless of the location of the bank. Since banks located in
similar geographic regions are subject to local, time-varying shocks that drive uncertainty or
incentives to misstate accounting numbers, these county-level economic factors are likely to
affect restatement rates. By introducing fixed-effects for every quarter within each county,
we remove differences in the aggregate level of restatement rates across counties and focus on
within-county-quarter differences in restatement rates between state- and national-chartered
17The Agarwal et al. (2014) regulatory leniency index is only defined for state-chartered banks. The
decision to assign a value of zero to federally-chartered banks is innocuous: the federal regulator fixed-effect
absorbs the mean of the regulatory leniency index within the group of federally chartered banks. The
federally-chartered banks are included in the analysis in order to benchmark the expected restatement rates
of the state-chartered banks located in the same region.
18All results are robust to using standard errors clustered at the county-by-regulator, state-level, bank-level,
or year-level. Specifications with standard errors clustered at the county-level are largely robust, though
statistically weaker than those of our main specifications.
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banks.
One possible concern in our setting is that the commercial banks select their charter
based on the perceived level of regulatory leniency. However, to generate our results, high
quality banks with a lower propensity to restate would have to be more likely to select state
regulators in more lenient states. We believe this is unlikely because it goes against existing
evidence that banks that switch charters are more likely to fail (Rezende (2016)). We show
that our results persist when we limit our sample to the banks that do not switch charters
during the sample period and to banks that were created prior to 1990. Therefore, our results
are unlikely to be driven by charter selection.
Another potential concern stems from the limitations of the leniency index used in the
empirical analysis. Because we do not know the exact dates of the on-site examinations, it is
not possible to observe whether the accounting restatements of state-chartered banks are
enforced following a federal or a state supervisor on-site visit. Our results could therefore
reflect the fact that the federal regulators are systematically detecting and correcting the
mistakes that strict state regulators have missed. We argue this alternative explanation is
unlikely for two reasons. First, Agarwal et al. (2014) suggest that their results are unlikely
to stem from an implicit “good cop/bad cop” behavior in which the regulators elicit more
information by having the federal regulators go “tough” and the state regulators go “easy”
on state banks. Second, because the state and federal regulators exogenously rotate in their
inspections of the state-regulated banks, this hypothesis would imply that restatements of
state-chartered banks would be delayed relative to those of federal-chartered banks, which are
solely regulated by federal regulators. Our evidence does not suggest that the restatements
rates of state-chartered banks lag those of the federal-chartered banks.
Finally, we note that if commercial banks rationally anticipate greater financial reporting
enforcement from strict regulators, they will optimally invest in accounting information
systems to reduce the probability of a misstatement. This behavior is likely to occur if the
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expected costs associated with a possible restatement are larger than the expected benefits
of misstating a regulatory report. We note, however, that if banks engage in this behavior,
our coefficients would be biased downwards as state-chartered banks regulated by stricter
regulators would be less likely to restate.19
4 Data and Key Variables
We use quarterly data covering the universe of commercial banks operating in the United
States between 2001 and 2010. Our sample starts in 2001 due to the availability of data on
regulatory call report restatements and ends in 2010 due to the availability of the Agarwal
et al. (2014) leniency index. We exclude savings banks and credit unions from the sample
because these banks submit different types of regulatory reports (Thrift Financial Report
(TFR) and Credit Union call report, respectively), and they classify accounting restatements
following different guidelines.
The financial characteristics of commercial banks are taken from the call reports submitted
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The dataset contains financial charac-
teristics for commercial banks as well as the timing of regulatory accounting restatements.
We collect information on the size, capital structure, and portfolio composition for each bank,
as well as the date and type of accounting restatement.
Agarwal et al. (2014) provided the data to construct the state level U.S banking regulatory
index. This index captures the average relative difference in the bank regulatory CAMELS
ratings assigned by each state regulator versus the CAMELS rating assigned by the federal
regulator to the same banks in that state from 1996-2010.
19In robustness tests, we condition on several bank-specific measures of accounting information and internal
control system quality and find that the results are unaltered, suggesting that banks are not engaging in this
behavior. Results are reported in the Online Appendix.
16
A
u
th
or
M
an
u
sc
ri
p
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
5 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 shows the percentage of commercial banks reporting negative and positive re-
statements over the sample period. The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 was marked by
an unprecedented number of negative restatements. From 2001 to 2006, the percentage of
banks reporting negative restatements in their regulatory reports hovered around two percent,
whereas during 2007 and 2008 this percentage increased substantially to approximately 4%
and 10%, respectively. By contrast, the percentage of commercial banks reporting positive
restatements remained low and stable over the 2001 to 2010 period.
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of key variables used in our analysis.
There are 10,524 distinct commercial banks in our sample. The average commercial bank has
a regulatory leniency index of 0.076 suggesting that, on average, state regulators are more
lenient than federal regulators. The state regulator of the average bank assigns a CAMELS
rating that is 0.076 points higher than what would have been assigned to the same bank
by a federal regulator. CAMELS ratings are assigned on a scale from 1 through 5, thus the
difference is economically meaningful; state regulators assign a better CAMELS rating than
what would have been assigned to the same bank by federal regulators in 1 out of every 15
supervisory examinations.
The commercial banks report, on average, $1.1 billion in total assets. However, our sample
comprises a wide range of bank sizes with a standard deviation in total assets of $21 billion.
Seventy-five percent of the banks are state-chartered and hold a large percentage of their
assets in real estate lending.
A critical element of our research approach is that national banks and state banks located
in the same geographical regions have similar business models and, as a result, react similarly
to the same local economic shocks. In Panel B of Table 1, we assess whether national
and state-chartered banks have similar business models by comparing banks’ size, portfolio
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composition, asset quality, and capitalization. The average size of a national bank is greater
than that of a state bank because most systemically important financial institutions organize
as national banks. However, when we exclude these large commercial banks and focus on the
median and quartiles of the size distribution, national and state banks are not significantly
different from each other.20 The portfolio composition and asset quality of national and state
banks are very similar, suggesting that these banks operate on the same type of business
models and have similar risk profiles. These findings allay concerns that the national banks
are not a good benchmark for state banks.
Panel C of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the types of catch-up restatements.
Using a short description of the nature of the restatement available in the call reports,
we use textual analysis to identify five main categories of restatements: restatements due
to mathematical/clerical errors; restatements due to changes in accounting principles; re-
statements related to audit work; restatements related to tax issues; and “other” accrual
accounting related restatements. For each category, we show the frequency of restatements,
the share of the restatements that are negative, and the respective magnitude of the negative
restatements as a fraction of risk-weighted assets. We find that restatements related to
changes in accounting principles and restatements related to taxes make up a large portion of
the sample, each representing around 25% of all catch-up restatements. However, the largest
category of restatements relate to “other” accrual accounting estimates, representing 38%
of the sample. The types of restatements included in this final category are very dispersed
such that it is difficult to further parse and analyze sub-groups within the “other” accrual
accounting category. Nevertheless, in an effort to provide some additional descriptive detail
on some of the restatements in this category, we develop four sub-categories within this
group: restatements related to loan loss accounting estimates; restatements related to errors
20In additional robustness tests, we find that the results remain statistically and economically significant
when we eliminate large financial institutions from the sample.
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in the classification and valuation of the securities portfolio; restatements related to the
accounting for noncurrent items; and restatements related to problems with consolidation
accounting. Though these sub-categories represent a small portion of the overall sample
of catch-up restatements, they are the largest identifiable types of restatements within the
accrual accounting restatement group. In the Online Appendix, we present several examples
of each type of restatement.
6 Regulatory strictness and reporting restatements
6.1 The impact of regulatory strictness on negative restatements
We begin our empirical analysis focusing on whether regulatory leniency impacts the detection
and correction of accounting irregularities in the regulatory reporting of commercial banks.
If lenient regulators are less likely to enforce accounting rules, we expect banks with lenient
regulators to report fewer accounting restatements. However, it is possible that regulatory
leniency is unrelated to the likelihood of accounting restatements. For example, commercial
banks could anticipate the increased oversight by strict regulators and devote more financial
or human capital resources to improving financial reporting quality. If these additional
resource allocations help to detect or prevent call report misstatements, banks with strict
regulators may have a lower probability of errors or irregularities ex ante, leading to a lower
probability of forced restatements ex post.
In Panel A of Figure 3 we sort the state-chartered banks into five quintiles based on
the leniency index of their state regulator. We then plot the average likelihood of negative
restatements in each quintile. Approximately 3% of the banks that are supervised by the
most lenient regulators report negative restatements. By contrast, approximately 3.8% of
the banks that are supervised by the strictest regulators report negative restatements. The
plot is consistent with the idea that strict regulators are more likely to detect and enforce
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negative restatements.
An alternative explanation for the above pattern is that all state regulators behave alike,
but commercial banks facing strict regulators make more accounting errors than banks facing
lenient regulators. If this were the case, we expect to observe the same pattern in positive
restatements that we do in negative restatements. Panel B of Figure 3 plots the probability
of positive restatements by regulatory leniency quintile. We do not find a similar pattern for
positive restatements.
In Panels C and D of Figure 3, we sort the federally-chartered banks into five quintiles
based on the regulatory leniency index of their state regulator. Because federal regulators
are the sole regulator of federally-chartered banks, we do not expect that a quintile sort of
regulatory restatements of national banks based on the state regulatory leniency index will
generate the same patterns observed in Panels A and B of Figure 3.
Panel C of Figure 3 indicates that there is no clear upward or downward pattern in
restatements of national banks across state leniency bins, which suggests that the regulatory
leniency index captures differences in state regulatory enforcement rather than omitted
economic factors. Panel D of Figure 3 further reinforces these conclusions by showing no
trend in the percentage of positive restatements of federally-chartered banks across state
regulatory leniency bins.
In Table 2, we formally test whether regulatory leniency is related to the likelihood
of negative and positive restatements. In column (1) we report results that only include
the regulatory leniency index, county fixed-effects, quarter fixed-effects, and regulator-type
fixed-effects. The coefficient of the regulatory leniency index is -0.053 and is economically
meaningful; a one standard deviation increase in the leniency index (0.062) decreases the
likelihood of restatement by 0.33 percentage points (-0.053×0.062). This reduction represents
a 10% decrease in the likelihood of a negative restatement relative to the unconditional
probability of a negative restatement of 3.2% for the entire sample. In column (2) we report
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the results including county-by-quarter fixed effects, and in columns (3) - (6) we repeat the
analysis of columns (1) and (2), but we further condition on bank characteristics such as
size, portfolio composition, and asset quality. Even after controlling for these additional
characteristics, our main variable of interest remains statistically significant and economically
similar to that reported in column (1).
The results presented in Table 2 are consistent with two broad channels. First, they are
consistent with the hypothesis that stricter regulators are more likely to enforce regulatory
restatements that lower the regulatory capital ratios of their regulated entities. Second, they
are consistent with the idea that the entities regulated by strict state regulators have worse
accounting quality and are thus more likely to restate relative to entities regulated by lenient
regulators.
We examine these two explanations by re-estimating the results of columns (1) - (6) using
the likelihood of a positive restatement as the dependent variable. If banks regulated by
strict regulators have lower accounting quality than banks regulated by lenient regulators,
they would likely also have more positive restatements. The results presented in columns
(7) - (12) show that the regulatory leniency index has no statistically significant impact on
the likelihood of positive restatements. This evidence is consistent with the idea that strict
regulators more aggressively enforce regulatory restatements that lower banks’ regulatory
capital ratios.
Overall, the results reported in Table 2 and in Figure 3 suggest that stricter regulators
are more likely to enforce negative restatements relative to more lenient regulators. This
supports the notion that strong regulatory enforcement is more likely to curb accounting
practices that result in overstated capital. The results are also inconsistent with the idea
that strict regulators reduce financial reporting enforcement in response to concerns about
their destabilizing effects. Nevertheless, we recognize that the results are also consistent with
the joint hypothesis that lenient regulators have a lower ability to detect material errors and
21
A
u
th
or
M
an
u
sc
ri
p
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
that the latent distribution of accounting errors is asymmetric because banks are more likely
to overstate than to understate earnings.
6.2 Time-series effects of regulatory strictness
Next, we examine whether strict regulators are swifter in detecting and enforcing accounting
irregularities. Regulators could have superior information about the underlying loans, securi-
ties, investments, and other assets held by the bank, and they may have detailed knowledge
of the quality of these assets (e.g. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999)). Thus stricter
regulators may identify early signs of economic deterioration and increase their enforcement
relatively earlier. Alternatively, strict regulators may increase their oversight of banks only
after the problems with the banking and housing markets were already widely exposed.
In Table 3 we formally investigate whether strict regulators enforce accounting restatements
in a timely manner. To this end, we extend specification (1) and interact the regulatory
leniency index with measures of past and future financial distress faced by commercial banks.
Each measure is standardized for ease of interpretation. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3
we interact the regulatory leniency index with past and future values of the average TED
spread, calculated as the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and on
short-term U.S. Government debt (Matvos and Seru (2014); Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap,
and Shin (2008)). As shown in column (1), the effect of regulatory leniency on the likelihood
of accounting restatements in the quarter is significantly larger when market conditions
deteriorate in the subsequent year. By contrast, the results of column (2) suggest that strict
regulators are not associated with a significant increase in the likelihood of restatements
when the external capital market was distressed in the previous year. The results from
columns (1) and (2) suggest that stringent state regulators are more likely to act ahead of a
significant deterioration in market conditions, but are not incrementally more likely to act
after deterioration in the external capital market has already occurred. The results in column
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(1) suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the future TED spread is associated
with a 50% increase in the effect of regulatory leniency.
In columns (3) and (4), we replace the TED spread with a bank-specific measure of the
year-on-year change in the house price index of the local market. Following Granja et al.
(2017) we scale the change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) quarterly MSA
house price index by the level of deposits of the bank in each MSA. This measure captures
variation in the exposure of banks to geographic regions with severe house price declines. In
column (3), we interact the regulatory leniency index with the bank exposure to the house
price decline in the subsequent year. The results suggest that the effects of regulatory leniency
are significantly larger when the commercial banks are exposed to house price declines in
the future. A one standard deviation increase in the house price decline is associated with
a 60% increase in the effect of regulatory leniency on the likelihood of negative regulatory
accounting restatements. However, the results in column (4) show that the effect of regulatory
leniency on restatements is not significantly different when the bank is exposed to house price
declines in the previous year. Overall, our cross-sectional findings support the idea that strict
regulators act before the deterioration of economic and financial conditions. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that the results from our cross-sectional partitions could also be related to other
factors that are correlated with the TED spread and the house-price index.
Finally, we extend specification (1) and estimate time series effects of regulatory leniency
by interacting the leniency index with dummy variables for each quarter:
Pr(Restatement)itcr = αc + φt + ψr +
∑
t
βtLeniencycr ×Qrtt + ΓXit + itcr (2)
Figure 4 reports the coefficients on the quarter-dummy variable interactions, along with 95%
confidence intervals. The sharp impact of regulatory strictness in 2007 is consistent with
the notion that strict regulators tighten their monitoring efforts early, when the first signs
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of the housing crisis became apparent. The results are less pronounced after 2008 which is
consistent with the idea that even lenient regulators increased their enforcement of capital
adequacy once the problems of the banking system were widely recognized. A plausible
alternative explanation for the pattern in Figure 4 is that high restatement rates early in the
crisis meant that there were fewer mistakes to correct later in the crisis. We note, however,
that the effect of regulatory strictness on restatement rates is highest in 2007 which largely
preceded the apex of restatement rates in 2008 (see Figure 2). Thus, we take some comfort
that the pattern of evidence in Figure 4 is not simply an artifact of time-series variation in
restatement rates themselves.
6.3 Heterogeneity in the Time-series effects of regulatory strictness
Next, we investigate whether the effect of regulatory leniency on restatements varies based
on the bank’s loan portfolio. The prior literature suggests that Commercial and Real Estate
(CRE) loans were a risky asset class during the financial crisis. Granja et al. (2017) and
Cole and White (2012) show that the banks that failed in the aftermath of the crisis carried
a larger concentration of CRE loans relative to other types of loans. Therefore, if stricter
regulators anticipate the cross-sectional variation in the portfolio risk of commercial banks,
we would expect the effect of regulatory leniency on restatements to be more pronounced in
the pre-crisis period for banks with a high concentration of CRE loans.
To provide evidence on the heterogeneity in the timeliness of regulatory effectiveness,
we extend specification (1) and estimate the effect of regulatory leniency on restatements
in each quarter for banks with a high CRE concentration and for banks with a low CRE
concentration. Figure 5a reports the coefficients on the quarter-dummy variables, along
with 95% confidence intervals, for banks with a high concentration of CRE loans (above
the median). Consistent with the idea that stringent regulators act more swiftly in banks
that are more likely to be troubled, we find that the relation between regulatory quality and
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the enforcement of reporting transparency is strongest in quarters 1-3 of 2007. The effects
of regulatory leniency are statistically indistinguishable from zero in the early part of the
sample as well as during the peak of the financial crisis.
In Figure 5b, we plot the coefficients on the quarter-dummy variables for banks with a low
concentration of CRE loans. In contrast to the results in Figure 5a, the effects of regulatory
leniency on restatements is indistinguishable from zero both before the financial crisis and
during the peak of the financial crisis. There is some evidence that the relation between
regulatory oversight and restatements is stronger in the second quarter of 2010, well after the
effects of the financial crisis were largely known. Overall, the evidence in Figures 5a and 5b
suggests that stricter regulators were swifter in enforcing financial reporting rules for banks
with higher concentrations of CRE loans.
7 Robustness
7.1 Alternative dependent variables
One possible concern with our results is that our dependent variable does not capture and
measure the concept of reporting transparency either because the regulatory restatements are
less transparent than other amendments (Badertscher and Burks (2011)) or because these
restatements represent overzealousness of the regulator (e.g. Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2001)).
We address this concern by replacing our dependent variable with two alternative measures
of transparency. First, we study whether regulatory strictness impacts loan loss provisions
(e.g., Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013); Nicoletti (2016)) by estimating the following linear
regression:
LLPitcr = αc + φt + ψr +
∑
t
βtLeniencycr ×Qrtt +
4∑
s=−4
COi+s + ΓXit + itcr (3)
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where LLP represents the quarterly loan loss provisions of banks scaled by total assets, αc and
φt are dummy variables that capture time-varying and county-level unobservable economic
factors, and ψr controls for differences in the aggregate loan loss provisions between federal
and state regulators.
The main variable of interest is Leniencycr × Qrtt, which is defined as the interaction
between the regulatory leniency index and indicator variables for each quarter. COi+s
represents a series of lead and lag values of the ratio of loan charge-offs to total assets. Finally,
Xit is a vector of time-varying characteristics of the bank and includes the total assets of the
bank, total deposits of the bank, percentage of residential loans, percentage of CRE loans,
percentage of consumer loans, liquidity and capital ratios. 21
In Figure 6, we plot the time-series evolution of the coefficients βt. Following the third
quarter of 2007, regulatory leniency is associated with lower loan loss provisions. The relation
then becomes insignificant and reverses in the last quarter of 2010. These results are consistent
with the idea that strict regulators enforced greater loan loss provisions in 2007, when events
indicated potential impairments in banks’ loan portfolios. Financial institutions with more
lenient regulators catch up with loan loss provisioning in the last quarters of 2010, only after
the events of the financial crisis largely subside and markets start recovering. The results
reinforce the idea that strict regulators enforced recognition of accounting deficiencies and
reporting transparency in a timelier fashion.22
Second, we re-estimate our results using an alternative dependent variable that captures
the likelihood that banking regulators required an amendment to the call report (Badertscher
et al. (2016)). To determine whether a call report was amended we focus on whether the
21We trim the loan loss provision and charge-off variables at the 2.5th percentile to avoid the effect of
spurious outliers. The standard errors of some coefficients become slightly smaller as a result of this option
but the cyclical pattern of the main coefficients as well as their statistical significance at the peak and trough
of series are unaltered.
22Using loan loss provision timeliness as the dependent variable, Nicoletti (2016) shows that over a different
sample period, stricter regulators are also associated with more timely provisions.
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time stamp on the last call report submitted exceeds the 30-day statutory filing period,
which is a necessary condition to identify an amendment.23 We characterize call reports as
amended if the final time stamp exceeds the 30-day statutory filing period by more than 15
days. We choose 15 days because Badertscher et al. (2016) find that the median number of
days between original and restated report is 18 days. By focusing on amendments after a
fifteen-day window, we increase the likelihood that they result from the action of banking
regulators and private auditors.
We present the results of this analysis in Table 4. In columns (1) and (2) we show that
strict regulators are associated with a greater likelihood of regulatory amendments. A one
standard deviation increase in the regulatory leniency index reduces the likelihood of call
report amendment by 0.6 percentage points. In columns (3) and (4) we require that the time
stamp on the call report exceeds the 30-day statutory filing period by more than 45 days.
When we use this stricter threshold, the results remain economically significant but they lose
statistical significance in the specification of column (4).
One potential concern with the above analysis is that we are classifying late call reports as
amendments. Therefore, our results might suggest that banks operating under the jurisdiction
of strict banking regulators are more likely to file a late call report. We find this explanation
unlikely. Badertscher et al. (2016) find that 92% of their observations file an initial version
of their call report within the first five days after the statutory limit. We find that the last
time stamp on 25% of the call reports on our sample exceed the 30-day statutory limit by
two weeks. Together, these findings provide comfort that we are classifying amendments
correctly. Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2014) show that regulatory strictness leads to better
bank performance, which suggests that strictly regulated banks are less likely to file a late
call report.
23Badertscher et al. (2016) developed a proprietary database of call report amendments. Since we do not
have access to this database, we use this alternative approach to determine whether call reports were likely
to be amended.
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7.2 The impact of regulatory strictness by type of restatement
In equilibrium, the threat of a stricter regulator could induce both bank managers and their
auditors to initiate more restatements (e.g. Corona and Randhawa (2017)). While we do not
directly observe who required the restatements, we use the description of the restatements in
the call reports as a falsification exercise; we do not expect our regulatory leniency index to
explain restatements that are unlikely to be enforced by banking regulators.
Our results, reported in the Online Appendix, indicate that there is no effect of regulatory
leniency on restatements due to simple clerical errors, accounting principles, or related to
taxes. However, we do find that stricter regulators are more likely to impose restatements
related to the accounting for economic transactions. The results corroborate our claims that
regulatory strictness drives restatements.
7.3 Variation in accounting quality
Our objective in this paper is to capture the increased probability that a strict regulator
will detect and correct an error, rather than to capture variation in the bank’s propensity
to misreport. While our fixed effect structure controls for much of the potential unobserved
variation in underlying incentives that affect reporting quality, we supplement our tests by
controlling for the bank’s underlying accounting quality. First, we use loan loss provision
timeliness as in Beatty and Liao (2011). Second, we control for the level of audit intensity
performed for the bank by external auditors. The results, reported in the Online Appendix,
show that both the magnitude and statistical significance of the leniency index remains
unchanged even after controlling for these measures of accounting quality. This provides
further assurance that our results are attributable to variation in regulatory leniency.
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7.4 Regulator selection
A final concern with our results is that they might be driven by commercial banks that select
their charter-authority according to their perceived level of regulatory leniency. We limit
our sample to the banks that have not switched charters during the sample period, and we
exclude banks that were created after 1990 to mitigate the concern of bank self-selection. The
results, reported in the Online Appendix, show that the regulatory leniency index continues
to load in the predicted manner.
8 Conclusion
We explore a new measure of the leniency of state regulators in order to examine whether the
rigor of regulatory enforcement is associated with predictable variation in financial reporting
outcomes. The results of this analysis inform our understanding of the effects of regulatory
enforcement on the quality of banks’ financial reporting. Specifically, we find that lenient
regulators are less likely to enforce the restatement of accounting irregularities and are less
timely in correcting regulatory accounting restatements in response to the deterioration
in economic conditions. These findings suggest that regulators play an important role in
overseeing financial reporting outcomes of banks, particularly in periods leading up to a
financial crisis.
Overall, our results are likely to be of interest to both academics and policy makers.
Our paper adds to the literature on regulation, suggesting that regulatory leniency leads
to reduced disclosure quality. These results are likely to be useful to policymakers as they
debate the causes and consequences of the recent financial crisis.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis. Panel A reports summary statistics for the entire sample. Panel B
reports summary statistics separately for state-chartered and federal-chartered banks. Panel C reports summary statistics concerning the catch-
up accounting restatements by type of restatement. Federal Regulator is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank is chartered
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Regulatory Leniency Index is our measure of regulatory leniency of the state regulator which
is derived from the analysis in Agarwal et al. (2014) and is interpreted as the average difference between the federal regulator and each state
regulator in the bank regulatory ratings assigned to the same bank. Total Assets is the total assets of a bank in $000s (RCFD2170). Total
Deposits is the total deposits held by a bank in $000s (RCON2200). Residential Loans/Total Loans is measured as the percentage of residential
real estate loans (RCON1797+RCON5367+RCON5368) relative to total loans (RCFD2122). Commercial & Real Estate (CRE) Loans/Total
Loans is measured as the percentage of commercial and real estate loans (RCON1415+RCON1460+RCON1480+RCFD2746) relative to total
loans (RCFD2122). Consumer Loans/Total Loans is measured as the percentage of consumer loans (RCFDB538+RCFDB539+RCFD2011)
relative to total loans (RCFD2122). Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans is defined as nonperforming loans (nonaccrual) (RCFD1403) and
loans 90 days or more past due (RCFD1407) over total loans (RCFD2122). Other Real Estate Owned Ratio is defined as the ratio of other
real estate owned and acquired in the process of obtaining possession of collateral (RCFD2150) divided by total assets (RCFD2170). Unused
Commitment Ratio is defined as total unused commitments (RCFD3814 + RCFD3816 + RCFD3817 + RCFD3818 + RCFD6550 + RCFD3411)
divided by total unused commitments and total loans. Well Capitalized is an indicator variable if the Tier 1 Capital Ratio (RCON7204) of
the bank is above the well-capitalized threshold as defined by the FDIC. Negative Restatement is an indicator variable that takes the value of
one if the bank makes a negative restatement (RIADB507) on its prior years' Reports of Condition and Income due to corrections of material
accounting errors and changes in accounting principles. Positive Restatement is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank
makes a positive restatement (RIADB507) on its prior years' Reports of Condition and Income due to corrections of material accounting errors
and changes in accounting principles. Error Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and Income (RIADB507)
that are associated with mathematical or rounding errors. Principle Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and
Income (RIADB507) that are associated with changes in accounting principles. Audit Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of
Condition and Income (RIADB507) that are associated with the action of auditors. Tax Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports
of Condition and Income (RIADB507) that are associated with tax-related issues. Loan Loss Accounting Restatements are restatements
of prior years' Reports of Condition and Income (RIADB507) that are associated with loan loss accounting errors. Securities Portfolio
Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and Income (RIADB507) that are associated with accounting errors in the
sec rities and investment portfolio of the bank. Noncurrent Items Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and
Income (RIADB507) that are associated with accounting errors in the valuation of noncurrent balance sheet items. Consolidation Accounting
Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and Income (RIADB507) that are associated with accounting errors related
to consolidation accounting. Accrual Accounting Restatements are restatements of prior years' Reports of Condition and Income (RIADB507)
that are associated with errors in accrual accounting.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N Mean St. Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank Characteristics
Federal Regulator 310,500 0.226 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regulatory Leniency Index 310,500 0.076 0.062 0.000 0.084 0.116
Total Assets 310,500 1,139,067 21,060,706 54,765 113,812 259,178
Total Deposits 310,500 753,350 12,789,006 45,566 94,228 211,609
Loan Compositions
Residential Loans/Total Loans 310,500 0.280 0.188 0.143 0.247 0.374
Commercial & Real Estate (CRE) Loans/Total Loans 310,500 0.324 0.217 0.144 0.295 0.477
Consumer Loans/Total Loans 310,500 0.092 0.110 0.027 0.063 0.120
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans 310,500 0.014 0.025 0.002 0.007 0.017
Other Real Estate Owned Ratio 310,500 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.002
Unused Commitment Ratio 310,500 0.129 0.083 0.072 0.118 0.172
Well Capitalized 310,500 0.994 0.077 1.000 1.000 1.000
Types of Restatements
Negative Restatement 310,500 0.032 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000
Positive Restatement 310,500 0.020 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Panel B: Summary Statistics of State-Chartered Banks and Federal-Chartered Banks
N Mean St. Dev. p25 p50 p75
State-Chartered Banks
Regulatory Leniency Index 240,204 0.098 0.053 0.067 0.099 0.123
Total Assets 240,204 572,739 6,421,740 51,895 107,754 245,986
Total Deposits 240,204 404,850 3,780,277 43,151 89,510 201,059
Residential Loans/Total Loans 240,204 0.283 0.192 0.144 0.248 0.377
Commercial & Real Estate (CRE) Loans/Total Loans 240,204 0.326 0.221 0.139 0.295 0.484
Consumer Loans/Total Loans 240,204 0.088 0.104 0.025 0.06 0.115
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans 240,204 0.014 0.026 0.001 0.007 0.017
Other Real Estate Owned Ratio 240,204 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.002
Unused Commitment Ratio 240,204 0.127 0.081 0.071 0.116 0.169
Well Capitalized 240,404 0.995 0.077 1 1 1
Negative Restatement 240,204 0.032 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.000
Positive Restatement 240,204 0.021 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000
Federal-Chartered Banks
Regulatory Leniency Index 70,296 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 70,296 3,074,231 42,584,692 66,492 136,575 309,187
Total Deposits 70,296 1,944,188 25,918,870 54,933 112,555 249,503
Residential Loans/Total Loans 70,296 0.268 0.171 0.141 0.245 0.365
Commercial & Real Estate (CRE) Loans/Total Loans 70,296 0.319 0.203 0.157 0.294 0.452
Consumer Loans/Total Loans 70,296 0.107 0.126 0.035 0.073 0.135
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans 70,296 0.013 0.022 0.002 0.007 0.016
Other Real Estate Owned Ratio 70,296 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002
Unused Commitment Ratio 70,296 0.135 0.088 0.075 0.123 0.179
Well Capitalized 70,296 0.995 0.069 1 1 1
Negative Restatement 70,296 0.029 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000
Positive Restatement 70,296 0.018 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Restatements by Type
% Restatements Share Neg. Restatements % Risk-Weighted Assets
Error Restatements 1.90 43.26 -0.02
Principle Restatements 24.30 81.64 -0.15
Audit Restatements 9.96 50.83 -0.20
Tax Restatements 25.25 50.19 -0.21
Other Accrual Accounting Restatements 37.86 60.72 -0.22
Loan Loss Accounting Restatements 0.86 68.72 -0.67
Securities Portfolio Restatements 2.66 59.37 -0.24
Noncurrent Items Restatements 5.31 52.79 -0.17
Consolidation Accounting Restatements 2.26 45.07 -0.13
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Table 3: Likelihood of Negative Restatement: Timing Analysis
This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable Negative Restatement is an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if the bank makes an income-decreasing restatement on its prior years' Reports of Condition and Income due to corrections of material
accounting errors and changes in accounting principles. Regulatory Leniency Index is our measure of regulatory leniency of the state regulator
which is derived from the analysis in Agarwal et al. (2014) and is interpreted as the average difference between the federal regulator and
each state regulator in the bank regulatory ratings assigned to the same bank. Past TED Spread and Future TED Spread are the average
TED spreads over the past and subsequent four quarters, respectively. Past HPI Change and Future HPI Change are the House Price
Index (HPI) growth rates in the bank’s branch service area over the past and subsequent four quarters, respectively. The HPI change is
calculated using the all-transactions indexes at the MSA and state non-metropolitan levels provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
We calculate the HPI change for each bank by weighting the HPI change variable for each bank by the percentage of deposits of the bank.
Other controls include Ln(Total Assets), Ln(Total Deposits), Residential Loans/Total Loans, Consumer Loans/Total Loans, CRE Loans/Total
Loans, Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Other Real Estate Owned Ratio, Unused Commitment Ratio, andWell Capitalized. All specifications
include Quarter/County Fixed-Effects and Regulator Fixed-Effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses, and are clustered at the level
of the state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative Restatement
Regulatory Leniency Index -0.0589*** -0.0589*** -0.0577*** -0.0598***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Regulatory Leniency Index × Future TED Spread -0.0370**
(0.015)
Regulatory Leniency Index × Past TED Spread -0.0103
(0.009)
Future HPI Change -0.0163*
(0.009)
Regulatory Leniency Index × Future HPI Change 0.0342*
(0.018)
Past HPI Change -0.0069
(0.008)
Regulatory Leniency Index × Past HPI Change 0.0292
(0.019)
Observations 310,500 310,500 309,038 309,038
Adjusted-R2 0.356 0.356 0.357 0.357
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulator Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter/County Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Likelihood of Call Report Amendment
This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable Amendment which is an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if the last time stamp on each individual call report exceeds the corresponding call report deadline by n days, where n = {15,45}.
Regulatory Leniency Index is our measure of regulatory leniency of the state regulator which is derived from the analysis in Agarwal et al.
(2014) and is interpreted as the average difference between the federal regulator and each state regulator in the bank regulatory ratings assigned
to the same bank. ln(Total Assets) is the the natural logarithm of total assets of a bank (ln(RCFD2170)). ln(Total Deposits) is the natural
logarithm of total deposits held by a bank (ln(RCON2200)). Residential Loans/Total Loans is measured as the percentage of residential
real estate loans (RCON1797+RCON5367+RCON5368) relative to total loans (RCFD2122). Consumer Loans/Total Loans is measured as the
percentage of consumer loans (RCFDB538+RCFDB539+RCFD2011) relative to total loans (RCFD2122). CRE Loans/Total Loans is measured
as the percentage of commercial and real estate loans (RCON1415+RCON1460+RCON1480+RCFD2746) relative to total loans (RCFD2122),
and Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans is defined as non-performing loans (non-accrual) (RCFD1403) and loans 90 days or more past due
(RCFD1407) over total loans (RCFD2122). Unused Commitment Ratio is defined as total unused commitments divided by total unused
commitments and total loans. Well Capitalized is an indicator variable if the Tier 1 Capital Ratio of the bank is above the well-capitalized
threshold as defined by the FDIC. All specifications include Quarter/County Fixed-Effects and Regulator Fixed-Effects. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses and are clustered at the level of the state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amendment
Regulatory Leniency Index -0.1262** -0.1108* -0.0972* -0.0873
(0.053) (0.062) (0.051) (0.060)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0353*** 0.0327*** 0.0265*** 0.0242***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Ln(Total Deposits) 0.0120** 0.0142** 0.0107* 0.0128*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Residential Loans/Total Loans -0.0329* -0.0270 -0.0239 -0.0204
(0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
Consumer Loans/Total Loans -0.0512* -0.0476 -0.0335 -0.0316
(0.027) (0.033) (0.025) (0.030)
CRE Loans/Total Loans 0.0518*** 0.0559** 0.0376** 0.0379*
(0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021)
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans 0.6397*** 0.5687** 0.5411*** 0.4815**
(0.193) (0.242) (0.172) (0.217)
Other Real Estate Owned Ratio 1.2068*** 1.0885** 0.8944*** 0.8431*
(0.302) (0.434) (0.293) (0.438)
Unused Commitment Ratio 0.0180 0.0317 0.0275 0.0397
(0.029) (0.035) (0.026) (0.033)
Well Capitalized 0.0036 -0.0131 0.0122 -0.0006
(0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028)
Observations 163,255 163,255 163,255 163,255
Adjusted-R2 0.124 0.371 0.105 0.355
Number of late days >15 days >15 days >45 days >45 days
Quarter Fixed-Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed-Effects Yes No Yes No
Regulator Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter/County Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
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